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DISTRIBUTION TO UNDO EXCESS: THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT LOOKS TO AN 
EQUITABLE APPROACH TO APPORTION 
THE COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CLEANUP IN AMERIPRIDE SERVICES INC. v. 
TEXAS EASTERN OVERSEAS INC. 
Abstract: On April 2, 2015, in AmeriPride Services Inc. v. Texas Eastern 
Overseas Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit joined the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in holding that district courts are not 
bound to a single method of distributing response costs in contribution actions 
under § 9613(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). The First and Ninth Circuits have held 
that courts may allocate such costs according to the most equitable method as 
long as it is consistent with the language and the purposes of CERCLA. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, alternatively, has ruled that dis-
trict courts must allocate response costs using the method prescribed by the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which accounts for settlements 
by reducing total liability by the dollar amount of the agreement. This Com-
ment argues that the First and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of CERCLA is 
correct because it accounts for the variety and complexity of contribution ac-
tions under CERCLA and because it furthers CERCLA’s goals of promoting 
the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and ensuring that parties respon-
sible for environmental harm bear the cost of cleaning the damage. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, consultants for AmeriPride Services Inc. (“AmeriPride”), dis-
covered evidence of perchloroethylene (“PCE”) in the soil under its Sacra-
mento, California location.1 PCE is a solvent used in dry cleaning, exposure 
to which has been found to be carcinogenic in a number of studies.2 PCE is 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See AmeriPride Servs. Inc. v. Tex. E. Overseas Inc. (AmeriPride II), 782 F.3d 474, 481 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
 2 See generally NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, TOXICOLOGY AND CARCINOGENESIS STUDIES 
OF TETRACHLOROETHYLENE (PERCHLOROETHYLENE) (1986), https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/htdocs/
lt_rpts/tr311.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7BV-QXHA] (finding clear evidence of carcinogenicity of Per-
chloroethylene (“PCE”) in rats exposed to the chemical); Tetrachloroethylene (Perchloroethylene), 
AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/intheworkplace/
tetrachlorethylene-perchloroethylene [https://perma.cc/ZM7C-R638] (“[PCE] has been suspected of 
causing some types of cancer, based on both human and animal evidence.”). 
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also listed as a “hazardous substance” under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), which the 
statute defines as “such elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and sub-
stances which, when released into the environment may present substantial 
danger to the public health or welfare or the environment.”3 Under CER-
CLA’s statutory framework, costs of response associated with cleanup may 
be distributed among parties liable for environmental harm using equitable 
factors deemed relevant by the courts, with an emphasis on encouraging 
elective cleanup by private parties.4 Section 9613(f) also provides parties 
held responsible for contamination at a hazardous waste site with a cause of 
action for contribution against other “potentially responsible parties” 
(“PRPs”) for cleanup costs resulting from the same environmental harm 
when the party that performed the cleanup has paid a sum in excess of its 
equitable portion.5 In the event of partial settlement among a number of 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (2012) (defining “hazardous substances,” in relevant part, as “such 
elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, when released into the environ-
ment may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment . . . .”). 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) 
further defines “hazardous substances” as substances named by section 311(b)(2)(A) of the Feder-
al Water Pollution Control Act, section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, section 307(a) of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or section 112 of the Clean Air Act; and any “imminent-
ly hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken 
action pursuant to section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act.” Id. § 9601 (definitions). CER-
CLA excludes “petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise spe-
cifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance,” and “natural gas, natural gas liquids, liq-
uefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel.” Id. Perchloroethylene is also called “perchlo-
roethene,” “tetrachloroethylene,” and “tetrachloroethene.” See Matthew Valentine, Comment, 
Regulating Soil Vapor Intrusion in New York State, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 457, 464, 471 & 
n.134 (2006). “Tetrachloroethene” is listed as a “hazardous substance” in the Code of Federal 
Regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2015). 
 4 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012); Frank B. Cross, Settlement Under the 1986 Superfund 
Amendments, 66 OR. L. REV. 517, 541 (1987) (concluding that the inclusion of settlement authori-
ty in § 9622 of CERCLA is “significant testimony” of Congress’s plan to encourage voluntary 
settlement of liability disputes over hazardous waste sites); Joseph A. Fischer, Comment, All 
CERCLA Plaintiffs Are Not Created Equal: Private Parties, Settlements, and the UCATA, 30 
HOUS. L. REV. 1979, 1989–90 (1994) (noting that CERCLA evinces Congress’s intent to promote 
private response to hazardous waste sites). 
 5 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); see also William B. Johnson, Annotation, Amount and Character-
istics of Wastes as Equitable Factors in Allocation of Response Costs Pursuant to § 113(f)(1) of 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9613(f)(1): Multiple Waste Streams, 162 A.L.R. FED. 371, § 2[a] (2000). Under CERCLA, “poten-
tially responsible parties” (“PRPs”) are “covered persons,” which are defined in § 9607 as: 
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of 
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such 
hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, 
or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for 
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned 
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PRPs, where some but not all parties have entered agreements with the par-
ty suing for contribution, CERCLA is silent on how to account for the value 
of such settlements in future contribution actions against non-settling par-
ties.6 
This ambiguity in CERCLA has left courts divided on how to interpret 
§ 9613(f) when accounting for third party settlements. 7  In 2015, in 
AmeriPride Services Inc. v. Texas Eastern Overseas Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit joined the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in concluding that trial courts have discretion under § 9613(f) to 
determine the most equitable method of accounting for settlements in a pri-
vate party’s contribution action against non-settling parties.8 Alternatively, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that the proper 
way to account for settlements is a method proposed by the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”), which provides for the reduc-
tion of total liability by the dollar amount of the settlement.9 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s is the proper interpreta-
tion of § 9613(f) of CERCLA.10 Part I reviews the factual and procedural 
history of AmeriPride and the legislative history of CERCLA.11 Part II ex-
plores the circuit split between the First, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits on the 
issue of how to account for third-party settlements in contribution actions 
under CERCLA.12 Part III argues that the First and Ninth Circuits correctly 
interpreted CERCLA in holding that district courts have discretion under 
                                                                                                                           
or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of 
response costs, of a hazardous substance . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012); see Amy Lewis Champagne, Note, Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. 
Aigner Corp.: The Settlement Credit Issue Answered for CERCLA Litigation?, 62 LA. L. REV. 
247, 249 & n.18 (2001) (defining “potentially responsible parties”). Under § 9607(a), any party 
that has owned a contaminated site could be held liable for the full costs of historical contamina-
tion. Tom Lininger, Green Ethics for Lawyers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 61, 83–84 & n.114 (2016). 
 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); see also Champagne, supra note 5, at 255 (noting that following 
the enactment of CERCLA it was unclear what credit rule applied when settlements included only 
private parties). “Non-settling parties” are those parties who have not entered into an agreement 
with the party suing for contribution. See Champagne, supra note 5, at 247. 
 7 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487–88; Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6, 20 (1st 
Cir. 2004); Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 8 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487–88; Capuano, 381 F.3d at 20. 
 9 See Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308. 
 10 See infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–39 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 40–80 and accompanying text. 
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§ 9613(f) to determine the most equitable method of accounting for settle-
ments in a private party’s contribution action against non-settling parties.13 
I. AMERIPRIDE AND THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA 
On April 2, 2015, in AmeriPride, the Ninth Circuit held that district 
courts have discretion to account for partial settlements in private party con-
tribution actions under CERCLA by considering equitable factors.14 This 
Part first details the factual and procedural history of AmeriPride, including 
the lower court’s decision on remand.15 This Part then examines the lan-
guage and legislative history of CERCLA and its 1986 amendment, the Su-
perfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, which added the provision 
at issue in AmeriPride.16 
A. Factual and Procedural History of AmeriPride 
In 1997, AmeriPride, the owner of an industrial dry cleaner in Sacramen-
to, California, found evidence of PCE contamination in the soil beneath its 
business.17 Releases of PCE into the soil and groundwater occurred under both 
the previous owner’s and AmeriPride’s operations.18 Chromalloy American 
Corporation (“Chromalloy”), which owned property near the Sacramento site, 
also contributed to the contamination on AmeriPride’s property.19 AmeriPride 
has been performing cleanup efforts at the site since 2002.20 
In 2000, AmeriPride filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of California against Valley Industrial Services, Petrolane, 
and Texas Eastern Overseas (“TEO”)—the former owners of the site—as 
well as fellow polluter Chromalloy, under §§ 9607 and 9613 of CERCLA, 
seeking costs incurred in responding to the PCE contamination.21 Subse-
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 81–96 and accompanying text. 
 14 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 488. 
 15 See infra notes 17–29 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 30–39 and accompanying text. 
 17 AmeriPride Servs., Inc. v. Valley Indus. Serv., Inc., No. Civ. S–00–113 LKK/JFM, 2011 
WL 1833179, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2011). 
 18 AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 480. 
 19 Id. at 481. 
 20 Id. In 2002, a California state agency took control of the site and has been directing 
AmeriPride’s cleanup of the PCE contamination around the Sacramento site. Id. In the intervening 
five years between detection and remediation, AmeriPride was conducting investigation and 
cleanup efforts as mandated by California state law. Id. 
 21 Third Amended Complaint at 1–2, AmeriPride Servs., Inc. v. Valley Indus. Serv., Inc. 
(AmeriPride I), 2012 WL 3913081 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012) (No. Civ. S–00–113 LKK/JFM), 
2000 WL 35799756 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2000). The site was formerly operated for a number of 
years by Valley Industrial Services (“VIS”). AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 480. VIS, once a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Petrolane, Inc., eventually merged into Texas Eastern Overseas (“TEO”), 
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quently, AmeriPride entered into settlement agreements with Chromalloy 
and Petrolane totaling $3,250,000.22 The district court held TEO liable for 
AmeriPride’s response costs less the dollar amounts of settlements that 
AmeriPride received from Petrolane and Chromalloy.23 The district court 
then allocated this amount equally between AmeriPride and TEO.24 
In 2015, in AmeriPride, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held 
that district courts may distribute the costs of response associated with 
cleanup among parties liable for environmental harm using equitable factors 
deemed relevant by the courts, as long as the chosen method is consistent 
with § 9613(f)(1) and the purposes of CERCLA.25 The Ninth Circuit vacat-
ed the district court’s judgment against TEO and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings, ordering the lower court to explicate which equitable fac-
tors it considered when distributing the value of the settlements that 
AmeriPride received from Petrolane and Chromalloy to settling parties, or 
to choose such factors and allocate costs in accordance.26 
On remand, on September 28, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of California held that it would apply the proportionate 
share approach to account for the $3,250,000 settlement agreements.27 In 
reaching this decision, the court considered such equitable factors as: TEO’s 
reasonable reliance on the court’s initial decision to use the proportionate 
share approach; the requirement that settling parties Chromalloy and Petro-
lane defend settlement agreements eight years after they were reached in 
fairness hearings under the UCATA approach; and the lack of unfair results 
                                                                                                                           
which assumed its liabilities. Id. Petrolane sold the site in 1983, after which AmeriPride eventual-
ly purchased it. Id. TEO later asserted a counterclaim for contribution under § 9613(f). Id. at 481. 
 22 AmeriPride I, 2012 WL 3913081, at *2. 
 23 Id.; see UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1–9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1955). The district court first ruled that it would account for these settlements and apportion re-
sponse costs among all PRPs using the proportionate share approach of the Uniform Comparative 
Fault Act (“UCFA”). AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 488; see UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ 1–
11 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). Under the proportionate share approach, settlements are account-
ed for by determining the settling parties’ actual percentage of liability and then deducting that 
amount from the total liability, regardless of the cash value of the settlement agreement. UNIF. 
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6. After a bench trial, however, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of California did not determine the proportionate share of all PRPs and effectively imposed 
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”) approach. See AmeriPride I, 2012 
WL 3913081, at *2; see also infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (describing the UCATA ap-
proach). 
 24 AmeriPride I, 2012 WL 3913081, at *2. TEO appealed the district court’s decision after the 
court denied its motion to amend or alter the judgment. AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 483. 
 25 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 488 (concluding that courts must utilize their discretion in a 
way that aligns with the language of § 9613(f)(1) and CERCLA’s objectives). 
 26 Id. at 488, 492. 
 27 AmeriPride Servs. Inc. v. Tex. E. Overseas Inc., No. 2:00-cv-00113-MCE-EFB, 2015 WL 
5734544, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2015). 
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for AmeriPride under the proportionate share approach.28 The court rea-
soned that the proportionate share approach was consistent with CERCLA’s 
central purpose of environmental protection because it would not conflict 
with the quick cleanup of the hazardous waste site at issue in this case.29 
B. The Legislative History of CERCLA 
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA to promote prompt cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the parties responsible for envi-
ronmental contamination bear the costs of necessary cleanup efforts. 30 
When a state or the federal government detects hazardous waste contamina-
tion at a given site, the government actor may bring suit under § 9607 to 
recover its costs of response against the parties responsible for the contami-
nation.31 In a cost recovery suit under § 9607, CERCLA imposes joint and 
several liability against each PRP for the contamination at a hazardous 
waste site.32 As originally enacted, CERCLA did not contain a provision 
explicitly allowing a private party that had taken on the costs of cleanup to 
seek contribution from other parties responsible for the contamination at a 
hazardous waste site.33 
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act, which expressly created a cause of action by which private par-
ties who believed that they had contributed more than their equitable por-
tion to the cost of cleanup could seek contribution from other parties re-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See id. at *4–5. 
 29 Id. at *5. The court found that there was no reason to believe that the cleanup of the site 
would end if it adopted the proportionate share approach, as cleanup had been ongoing since 2002. 
Id. The court also found that the proportionate share approach would not deter settlement in this 
case because the only remaining defendant was TEO, and neither TEO nor AmeriPride indicated 
that application of this approach would deter it from settling. Id. 
 30 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 33, and 42 
U.S.C.); Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009) (quoting 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Util., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)); Martin A. 
McCrory, The Equitable Solution to Superfund Liability: Creating a Viable Allocation Procedure 
for Businesses at Superfund Sites, 23 VT. L. REV. 59, 59 (1998). CERCLA is also known as “the 
Superfund Act.” McCrory, supra. 
 31 See Capuano, 381 F.3d at 9 (citing United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 28–29 (1st Cir. 
2001)). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 9607; see Fischer, supra note 4, at 1983. Joint and several liability under 
CERCLA is subject only to four defenses, including: an act of God; an act of war; an act or omis-
sion of certain third parties; or any combination of the three. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Under a joint 
and several liability scheme, where one indivisible harm is caused by two or more parties, each 
party may be held liable for the whole harm. See United States v. W. Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 
930, 942 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (quoting United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 
(S.D. Ohio 1983)). 
 33 See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994); United States v. Cannons 
Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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sponsible for contamination at a hazardous waste site.34 Under the language 
of § 9613(f), response costs may be allocated among liable parties using 
such equitable factors deemed proper by the court.35 Liability in contribu-
tion actions is not joint and several; rather, each party’s liability will corre-
spond in theory with its individual share of fault for contamination at the 
site.36 In the event of partial settlement among a number of PRPs where a 
party reaches a settlement with a state or the federal government, CERCLA 
allows for the reduction of the total liability of all PRPs not made party to 
the agreement by the dollar amount of the settlement agreement.37 There is, 
however, no analogous provision in CERCLA that dictates how to account 
for settlements between private parties.38 Thus, determination of the proper 
method of accounting for private settlements in a contribution action under 
CERCLA has generally been left to the courts.39 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 
Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012)). Section 9613(f)(1) states that “[a]ny 
person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under sec-
tion 9607(a) . . .” for the costs of cleanup at a hazardous waste site. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); see 
also Johnson, supra note 5, at § 2[a] (noting that the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act added a cause of action for contribution for those parties who feel that they have paid more 
than their fair share of the cleanup costs). 
 35 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response 
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”). 
“Response costs” is not clearly defined by CERCLA. See § 9601; see also William B. Johnson, 
Annotation, What Are Necessary Costs of Response Within Meaning of § 107(a)(4)(b) of Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(b)), 113 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 2[a] (originally published in 1993). 
 36 See Davis, 261 F.3d at 29 (quoting Pinal Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 
1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997)) (holding that liability in contribution actions is based on each party’s 
portion of total liability, not a joint and several liability scheme). 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). For example, suppose that the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) sends notice of potential liability to ten PRPs for response costs totaling $10 million. See 
Cannons, 899 F.2d at 83 (providing an example of the EPA’s issuance of notices of potential lia-
bility). Later, the government settles with four defendants for $500,000 each, for a total of $2 
million. See id. The response costs for which the remaining six non-settling defendants are held 
joint and severally liable is then $8 million, or the total liability of $10 million less the value of the 
settlements reached between the government and settling parties of $2 million. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(f)(2); Cannons, 899 F.2d at 83; Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of 
Superfund: A Critique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 36, 69 
(1994) (“Hence, the liability of the nonsettlors is . . . reduced by the amount of the settlor’s settle-
ment . . . .”). 
 38 See Marc L. Frohman, Rethinking the Partial Settlement Credit Rule in Private Party 
CERCLA Actions: An Argument in Support of the Pro Tanto Credit Rule, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 
711, 735 (1995) (noting the nonexistence of a rule for accounting for partial settlements between 
private parties in contribution actions under CERCLA); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (lacking a provi-
sion dictating how to account for settlements between private parties). 
 39 See, e.g., AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487–88 (holding that the language of CERCLA does 
not mandate the application of a single method of accounting for settlements in private party con-
tribution actions); Capuano, 381 F.3d at 20 (holding that district courts have discretion to appor-
tion response costs among liable parties); Akzo, 197 F.3d at 307 (holding that district courts must 
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II. COMPETING APPROACHES TO CONTRIBUTION: UCATA, 
PROPORTIONATE SHARE, AND EQUITY 
U.S. Courts of Appeals are split regarding the proper method of ac-
counting for private party settlements under CERCLA.40 This Part examines 
the various approaches taken by U.S. Courts of Appeals in accounting for 
settlements between private parties. 41  Section A details the UCATA ap-
proach adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which 
accounts for partial settlements using a dollar-for-dollar rule.42 Section B 
explains the proportionate share approach, which reduces total liability by 
the percentage of liability of settling parties.43 Finally, section C explains 
the equitable approach taken by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and 
Ninth Circuits, which gives courts discretion to determine the most equita-
ble method of accounting for partial settlement in a given case.44 
A. The UCATA Approach 
The UCATA approach involves reducing total liability only by the dol-
lar value of third-party settlements, an approach favored by CERCLA in 
settlements with the government.45 To illustrate, suppose that party A seeks 
contribution of response costs totaling $150,000 from potentially responsi-
ble parties B, C, and D.46 The proportionate liability of each party would 
                                                                                                                           
allocate response costs using the UCATA approach); see also Ferrey, supra note 37, at 53–54 
(noting that because CERCLA lacks certain stipulations related to liability, the evolving federal 
common law is an important tool in interpreting the statute). 
 40 Compare AmeriPride Servs. Inc. v. Tex. E. Overseas Inc. (AmeriPride II), 782 F.3d 474, 
487–88 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that district courts have discretion to determine the most equitable 
system to account for settlements), and Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 
2004) (holding that district courts have discretion to apportion response costs among liable par-
ties), with Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that district courts must allocate response costs using the UCATA approach). 
 41 See infra notes 45–80 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 45–53 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 54–67 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 68–80 and accompanying text. 
 45 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2012) (providing that a party’s settlement agreement with a 
state or the federal government reduces total liability by the dollar value of the settlement); UNIF. 
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1–9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1955); Akzo, 197 F.3d 
at 307, 308. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was first recommended for legisla-
tion by the Uniform Law Commission in 1939; the Act was subsequently revised in 1955. See 
W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 34 A.L.R. 2D 1107, § 1 
(1954). Though Congress has not adopted the UCATA, it has been enacted, with some modifica-
tions, in a number of states. See id.; see also Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (explaining that Congress has neither ratified the UCATA nor given any other guidance 
on the matter). 
 46 See Eric DeGroff, Raiders of the Lost Arco: Resolving the Partial Settlement Credit Issue 
in Private Cost Recovery and Contribution Claims Under CERCLA, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 332, 
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thus be $50,000.47 If party A entered a settlement for $25,000 from party B, 
parties C and D would remain severally liable for the remaining $125,000, 
even though their combined proportionate liability was only $100,000.48 
In 1999, in Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., the Seventh 
Circuit framed the issue of accounting for third-party settlements between 
private parties as a choice between the UCATA approach and the propor-
tionate approach.49 The Seventh Circuit found that the proper way to ac-
count for settlements in a § 9613 contribution action is to reduce third-party 
claims by the dollar amount of settlements reached between PRPs, opting 
for the UCATA approach.50 The court found the UCATA approach prefera-
ble as a matter of conserving judicial resources because the UCATA ap-
proach does not require courts to apportion each party’s individual liability 
for hazardous materials sent to a site over a period of what could be many 
years, which the proportionate share approach does require.51 Additionally, 
the Akzo court found that because CERCLA provides for a similar approach 
with regard to settlements with the government, the handling of private set-
tlements should be the same.52 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 
decision in McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
it should look to the way “intersecting principles of law” work, which, in 
contribution actions under § 9613(f), favors the UCATA approach.53 
                                                                                                                           
352–53 (2000). DeGroff used a variation of this hypothetical to illustrate the operation of the 
UCATA approach. See id. 
 47 See id.; see also UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2 (“In determining 
the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability (a) their relative degrees of fault shall not be 
considered; (b) if equity requires the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single 
share; and (c) principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.”). 
 48 DeGroff, supra note 46, at 353; see also UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT 
§ 4 (describing the UCATA’s rule for crediting partial settlements, where a settlement with one 
joint tortfeasor reduces total liability for the others by either the amount provided in the agreement 
or the dollar amount paid in settlement, whichever is greatest). 
 49 See Akzo, 197 F.3d at 307; see also DeGroff, supra note 46, at 350 (noting that courts have 
generally adopted the proportionate share approach or the UCATA approach to account for partial 
settlements in contribution actions under CERCLA). In 1999, in Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner 
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that the choice between these two 
approaches could produce large disparities in “incentives to settle” and in the level of complication of 
the litigation. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 307. 
 50 See Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308. 
 51 See id.; see also Fischer, supra note 4, at 2029. Under the proportionate share approach, 
settling parties are forced to dispute contribution problems with non-settlors in order to minimize 
the settlor’s liability and maximize the share of parties that have not settled, potentially making 
CERCLA litigation more difficult and costly than other approaches. See Fischer, supra note 4, at 
2029–30. 
 52 See Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308. 
 53 See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 217 (1994); Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308. In 
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, in 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that even though the pro-
portionate share approach and the UCATA approach were “closely matched,” the proportionate 
share approach was a better system to account for settlements in contribution actions because of 
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B. The Proportionate Share Approach 
Under the proportionate share approach, a method utilized by the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act, settlements are accounted for by determining 
the settling parties’ actual percentage of liability and then reducing total liabil-
ity by that amount, without regard for the dollar amount of the settlement.54 
For example, suppose the court determines that party A is responsible for 
40% of the contamination at a hazardous waste site, party B is responsible for 
10%, and party C for 50%.55 Party A performs the cleanup at a total cost of $3 
million, and later sues B and C for contribution; subsequently, A settles with 
B.56 Regardless of the dollar amount of the settlement, the total liability is 
then reduced by B’s 10% of the responsibility, or $300,000.57 $2.7 million 
then remains for apportionment between A and C.58 
The Ninth Circuit has noted that the proportionate share approach has 
generally been its preferred method of apportionment when interpreting 
statutes that allow contribution but do not make clear how to account for the 
value of partial settlement agreements. 59 In 1989, in Franklin v. Kaypro 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the Securities Act of 1933 
does not provide guidance regarding how to account for settlements in con-
tribution actions, it was necessary to create federal common law on the mat-
ter.60 The court found that the proper way to account for settlements was to 
                                                                                                                           
its consistency with a past case in admiralty law, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 
U.S. 397, 411 (1975). See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 217. In Reliable Transfer, the Court held that 
the proportionate share approach is the sole method to account for settlements in maritime actions 
and that liability will only be distributed in equal parts when the parties’ fault is equal or when it is 
impossible to equitably measure their relative degree of fault. See id. 
 54 See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); Akzo, 197 F.3d at 
307; see also J. Whitney Pesnell, The Contribution Bar in CERCLA Settlements and Its Effects on 
the Liability of Nonsettlors, 58 LA. L. REV. 167, 180 (1997) (concluding that under the propor-
tionate share approach, the potential liability of the nonsettlors is reduced by the settlors’ equitable 
shares of the response costs at a site). The Uniform Comparative Fault Act was approved by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1977. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE 
FAULT ACT §§ 1–11; Champagne, supra note 5, at 257. Since then, the UCFA has not been adopt-
ed by Congress and has been enacted in only a few states. See id. 
 55 See Akzo, 197 F.3d at 306. A variation of this hypothetical was provided by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to illustrate the operation of the proportionate share approach. 
See id. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6 (providing that the remaining liability is reduced 
by the settling party’s “equitable share of the obligation”). 
 58 See Akzo, 197 F.3d at 306. 
 59 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 484–85; see also In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 796 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (concluding that when one plaintiff brings an action against multiple defendants, the pro-
portionate share approach “is the law in the Ninth Circuit” when accounting for settlements). 
 60 See Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1228. A 1989 case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., was a class action suit involving contribution actions under the 
Securities Act of 1933. See id. at 1223. As with CERCLA, the Securities Act of 1933 imposes 
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allow a factfinder to determine the proportional responsibility of both set-
tling and non-settling defendants at trial, and then to hold non-settling de-
fendants liable for their remaining cumulative percentage of fault, a method 
consistent with the proportionate share approach.61 Under Franklin and sub-
sequent cases, the proportionate share approach was used in the Ninth Cir-
cuit when accounting for settlements in cases in which a single plaintiff 
brought an action against multiple defendants.62 
In 2015, in AmeriPride Services Inc. v. Texas Eastern Overseas Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit found that Congress did not intend to mandate application 
of the proportionate share approach in contribution actions between private 
parties.63 As a result, the court refused to read federal common law into the 
statute where it determined that it was contrary to congressional intent.64 
Because CERCLA prescribes a method for allocating liability to non-
settling third-party defendants only in actions involving settlements with a 
state or the federal government, the court concluded that Congress’s intent 
was not to require a particular approach in private party settlements.65 The 
court concluded that CERCLA’s overall statutory purpose weighs against 
mandatory application of the proportionate share approach because its pri-
mary focus is on protecting the environment and public health by making 
possible the fast and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites.66 Making 
sure that the parties responsible pay for the costs of cleanup, the court rea-
soned, is merely a subordinate purpose.67  
C. The Equitable Approach of the First and Ninth Circuits 
Section 9613(f)(1) of CERCLA provides that response costs may be 
allocated among liable parties using such equitable factors deemed proper 
                                                                                                                           
joint and several liability upon responsible parties and allows for contribution actions against any 
person who, if sued separately, would also have been held liable in an action under the statute. See 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (2012). 
 61 See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ 2, 6; Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231 (noting that 
where there has been a partial settlement, the proportionate share approach requires a jury to de-
termine both the total dollar amount of damages and the individual percentage of liability of set-
tling and non-settling defendants alike, after which non-settling defendants will be held jointly and 
severally liable for their total portion of the liability). 
 62 See In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d at 796 (concluding that the law in the Ninth Circuit dic-
tates the use of the proportionate share approach). 
 63 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 486. 
 64 See id. at 485. 
 65 See id. at 486; Franklin, 884 F.2d at 1231. 
 66 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487 (quoting Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 
F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001)) (holding that CERCLA’s first priority is safeguarding environmen-
tal and public health, with a secondary purpose of making sure that parties responsible for contam-
ination bear the financial burden of the cleanup). 
 67 See id. 
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by the court.68 Courts vested with this discretion are not limited to a certain 
set of factors, but rather may consider the equities in a given case in order to 
determine the most equitable method of accounting for settlements.69 Ap-
pellate courts review the decisions of district courts in these cases under an 
abuse of discretion standard.70 
In 2004, in American Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit weighed the relative merits of the UCATA and 
proportionate share approaches before affirming the lower court’s decision 
to use the UCATA approach to account for third-party settlements in contri-
bution actions under CERCLA. 71 The court noted that the proportionate 
share approach could lead to a futile investigation into the exact proportion-
al liability of each party, particularly where hazardous materials were 
dumped into a site over the course of many years.72 The court further rea-
soned that even though defendants’ liability will often be different from 
their equitable shares under the UCATA approach, the UCATA approach is 
more administrable and is the approach expressly adopted by CERCLA 
when there is a settlement between a party and a state or the federal gov-
ernment.73 
The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by applying the most equitable method for accounting for settling parties by 
using the UCATA approach.74 The court noted that though it may be sensi-
ble to choose one of these two approaches in the interest of uniformity, the 
language of § 9613(f) permits a district court the discretion to use equitable 
                                                                                                                           
 68 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response 
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”). 
 69 See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that § 9613(f)(1) 
does not limit the factors that a court may consider in its exercise of discretion); United States v. 
R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 571–72 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that § 9613(f)(1) clarifies Con-
gress’s intent to provide district courts with wide discretion to determine which equitable factors to 
use when apportioning response costs). 
 70 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 489 (holding that, in order to conduct meaningful abuse of 
discretion review, a district court must articulate the equitable factors it considered and how its deci-
sion furthered the goals of CERCLA); Capuano, 381 F.3d at 21 (concluding that a district court’s 
decision may sometimes lead to a result so inequitable that it constitutes an abuse of discretion). 
 71 See Capuano, 381 F.3d at 20 (interpreting CERCLA to provide trial courts the discretion to 
decide the “most equitable method” of taking settlements into account, and holding that the dis-
trict court’s determination was not an abuse of discretion under the facts of the case). 
 72 See id. (citing Akzo, 197 F.3d at 307). One benefit of the proportionate share approach, the 
court reasoned, is its ability to theoretically ensure that each party bears its equitable share of the 
damages. See id. 
 73 See id. at 21. The court reasoned, however, that one benefit of the UCATA approach is that 
defendants’ liability will frequently differ from their equitable shares because a settlement with 
one defendant for less than its share will require other defendants to pay more than their own 
share. See id. (quoting McDermott, 511 U.S. at 212). 
 74 See id. at 20. 
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factors to choose how a settlement affects its apportionment of liability.75 
The court observed that applying either the proportionate share approach or 
the UCATA approach may in some cases produce a result “so inequitable” 
as to constitute an abuse of discretion, but that in this case, it did not.76 
In AmeriPride, the Ninth Circuit adopted the First Circuit’s reasoning, 
concluding that a district court has discretion under § 9613(f)(1) to deter-
mine the most equitable method of accounting for settlements between pri-
vate parties in a contribution action.77 The court held that this method of 
accounting furthers CERCLA’s dual purposes of encouraging settlement 
through an incentive system and avoiding unnecessarily complicated litiga-
tion.78 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Sev-
enth Circuit’s conclusion in Akzo that the UCATA approach must be applied 
in every case because courts must use the UCATA approach in settlements 
with a state or the federal government.79 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that 
because the language of CERCLA mandates the use of UCATA for govern-
ment settlements but not for private settlements, Congress did not require 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id. at 21. 
 76 See id.; cf. Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, No. CIV. 05-1510 WBS EFB, 2009 WL 
256553, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2009). In 2009, in Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of California posited that the proportionate share approach can 
produce an inequitable result when a settling defendant pays less than its share. Adobe Lumber, 
2009 WL 256553, at *4. The court further noted that in that situation, the plaintiff cannot possibly 
recover fully since its total recovery is lowered by the settling defendant’s equitable share. Id. 
Under circumstances like these, one can imagine that application of the proportionate share ap-
proach may be “so inequitable” as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Capuano, 381 F.3d at 
21; see also AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 488 (holding that courts must exercise their discretion in a 
manner consistent with § 9613(f)(1) and the purposes of CERCLA and that choosing a method 
that would discourage settlement or produce plainly inequitable results could result in an abuse of 
discretion). 
 77 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487 (citing Capuano, 381 F.3d at 
20–21) (holding with the First Circuit’s “well-reasoned” decision to account for settlements ac-
cording to the most equitable method). 
 78 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 486 (quoting Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 
710 F.3d 946, 971 (9th Cir. 2013)); see also In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 
1992) (holding that Congress intended CERCLA to promote settlements that avoid spending public 
money on long trials); Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. City of Chi., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 
1235 (E.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Dravo Corp., No. 8:01–CV–500, 2002 WL 1832274, at *3 
(D. Neb. Mar. 6, 2002) (concluding that a court has two goals in a CERCLA case: encouraging effi-
ciency in the remediation of environmental contamination and promoting efficient settlement). 
 79 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 488; Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308 (concluding that, to determine 
which approach to apply to partial settlements, it was “best to match the handling of settlements 
with the way intersecting principles of law work,” which, for CERCLA is the UCATA approach, 
because CERCLA provides for pro tanto accounting with regard to settlements with the govern-
ment). 
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federal courts to adopt a single method of allocating liability among non-
settling parties.80 
III. NOTHING WILL COME OF NOTHING: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S WISDOM 
AND THE WAY FORWARD 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted 
§ 9613(f)(1) to allow district courts the discretion to determine the most 
equitable method of accounting for settlements in contribution actions un-
der CERCLA.81 First, this Part argues that the Ninth Circuit’s equitable ap-
proach is the proper reading of § 9613(f)(1).82 Next, this Part argues that 
mandatory application of either the proportionate share approach or the 
UCATA approach is contrary to the goals of CERCLA and thus based on an 
inappropriate understanding of the language of the statute.83  
The Ninth Circuit ruled correctly in determining that Congress did not 
require a single method of accounting for settlements between private par-
ties in contribution actions under § 9613(f)(1).84 CERCLA was designed to 
promote the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites, to ensure that parties 
responsible for environmental contamination incur the costs of the cleanup 
efforts, and to encourage settlement in the promotion of elective private 
cleanup.85 In the interest of these statutory goals, § 9613(f) provides district 
courts with the discretion to allocate response costs based on “such equita-
ble factors as the court determines are appropriate,” which is directly tied to 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 488 (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 
208 (1993)) (noting that when Congress uses specific words in one part of a statute and not in 
another, it is thought to have acted deliberately to use such language or exclude it). 
 81 See AmeriPride Servs. Inc. v. Tex. E. Overseas Inc. (AmeriPride II), 782 F.3d 474, 487–88 
(9th Cir. 2015); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 82 See infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 88–96 and accompanying text. 
 84 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2012) (granting district courts discretion to apportion response 
costs according to equitable factors); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 763, 
771 n.11 (N.D. Okla. 1993) (noting that because Congress neither expressly provided for nor ex-
pressly barred application of the UCATA approach, the language of the statute grants courts dis-
cretion to follow that approach or to look to equitable factors to apportion costs among responsible 
parties). In 1993, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., the Northern District of 
Oklahoma noted that the proportionate share approach is likewise permissible, but not required as 
the only equitable method of apportionment, under the language of CERCLA. Atl. Richfield, 836 
F. Supp. at 771 n.11. But see Fischer, supra note 4, at 2037 (concluding that because the UCATA 
approach is most protective of the public health and the environment, courts must apply this ap-
proach). 
 85 See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009) (quot-
ing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Util., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)); AmeriPride II, 
782 F.3d at 487; Fischer, supra note 4, at 1988. 
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a court’s method of accounting for settlements.86 Thus, given the plain lan-
guage of the statute, and in consideration of the complex nature of cases 
involving hazardous waste contamination, it follows that district courts 
must have discretion to balance equities on a case-by-case basis in order to 
account for settlements in the way that best furthers the goals of the statute 
given a particular set of facts.87 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit was correct in its holding that CERCLA 
does not require mandatory imposition of the proportionate share approach 
in contribution actions under § 9613(f)(1) because of its incompatibility 
with the goals of CERCLA in some cases.88 The proportionate share ap-
proach requires a complicated investigation into each party’s proportionate 
share of the blame for contamination at a hazardous waste site.89 Undertak-
ing this inquiry runs counter to CERCLA’s goal of promoting the prompt 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, as it requires drawn-out and complex liti-
gation regarding responsibility for environmental contamination that, in 
reality, may not be cleanly divisible in the end.90 To require courts to use the 
proportionate share approach in cases where the harm cannot be divided, 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate re-
sponse costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appro-
priate.”); Capuano, 381 F.2d at 21 (concluding that CERCLA gives district courts discretion with 
regard to how to allocate response costs, which includes determining how to account for settle-
ments); DeGroff, supra note 46, at 371 (noting that CERCLA is “truly silent” on the issue of a 
mandate for crediting partial settlements in private party actions); Frohman, supra note 38, at 746 
(arguing that Congress’s failure to include a provision dictating how to account for settlements in 
private party contribution actions should be interpreted as providing lower courts with discretion). 
Courts have generally held that a district court is not bound to an enumerated set of equitable 
factors in the exercise of its discretion. See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 
1998) (concluding that § 9613(f)(1) does not restrict a court’s discretion to a certain list of factors, 
but rather allows a district court the ability to look to all the equities in a given case in order to 
administer justice); see also Envtl. Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 
1992) (concluding that § 9613(f)(1) makes obvious that Congress intended to let courts use their 
discretion to determine which factors to consider, rather than binding courts to a certain set of 
factors); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 571–72 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the language of § 9613(f)(1) evinces congressional intent to give district courts broad discretion in 
determining which equitable factors they use to allocate response costs). 
 87 See H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 3, at 2214 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 
3206 (clarifying Congress’s intent to resolve contribution claims on a case-by-case basis, with 
consideration for relevant equitable factors); AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487–88; see also Envtl. 
Transp. Sys., 969 F.2d at 509 (holding that apportioning cleanup costs is an exercise that lends 
itself well to a particularized determination in each individual case). 
 88 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487; Ferrey, supra note 37, at 355 (noting that under the 
UCFA approach, a plaintiff may receive an amount less than the actual damages incurred in 
cleanup); supra note 77 and accompanying text (highlighting that inequity may result when one 
party settles for less than its fair share, precluding a plaintiff from recovering the total measure of 
damages). Defendant TEO argued that CERCLA required mandatory imposition of the propor-
tionate share approach. AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487. 
 89 See Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 90 See Fischer, supra note 4, at 2006–07. 
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then, is to hold parties liable for a share of the total liability that is at best a 
guess, and may not result in an equitable apportionment of response costs, 
particularly if settling parties have paid substantially less than their equita-
ble share in settlement.91 Because the proportionate share approach may 
tend to produce inequitable results in certain contribution actions under 
CERCLA, mandating its application is contrary to the language of the stat-
ute, which provides district courts with the discretion to choose the most 
equitable method of accounting for settlements.92 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit appropriately declined to follow the 
Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the UCATA approach must be applied in 
every contribution action under CERCLA because that holding is based on 
an inappropriate reading of the statute.93 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
because CERCLA requires application of the UCATA approach in settle-
ments involving a state or the federal government, it follows that the UCA-
TA approach must also be used in private party settlements.94 As a matter of 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 484 (concluding that, under the UCFA approach, parties 
who do not settle are held responsible merely for their proportionate share of cleanup costs, even 
in the event that parties who settle pay less than their equitable portion of the harm). But see 
Fischer, supra note 4, at 2006–07 (positing that harm at CERCLA sites is never divisible). A sce-
nario in which chemicals are traceable only to one specific defendant, however, would allow a 
court to cleanly divide the damage. See United States v. W. Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 942 
(W.D. Wash. 1990). For example, in a 1990 case from the Western District of Washington, United 
States v. Western Processing Co., a portion of the contamination at a hazardous waste site was 
specifically traceable to one defendant because of the nature of the chemicals it had dumped on 
the site. Id. Rare though such cases may be, district courts must have discretion to account for 
settlements according to proportionate blame using the UCFA approach in instances where the 
harm is divisible in some way. See id. (concluding that the possibility exists that a defendant may 
demonstrate that its actions created a specific, separate harm in some cases). This construction is 
supported by the text of the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); infra notes 93–96 and accompany-
ing text (arguing that the express reference to “equitable factors” in § 9613(f)(1) allows courts 
discretion in the method they use to account for settlements). 
 92 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487 (holding that § 9613(f)(1) of 
CERCLA provides district courts with the discretion to determine which method is most equitable 
when accounting for settlements); Capuano, 381 F.3d at 21 (concluding that district courts may 
determine the most equitable method of accounting for settlements as an exercise of the discretion 
granted them by § 9613(f)(1)); DeGroff, supra note 46, at 355 (arguing that because the plaintiff 
cannot know at the time of settlement each defendant’s exact proportionate share, the UCFA ap-
proach “virtually guarantees” that the amount recovered by the plaintiff will be different from the 
exact amount to which it is entitled). 
 93 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (providing that the court may allocate response costs “using 
such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate” but not mandating any one method 
of apportionment); AmeriPride II, 782 F.3d at 487–88 (declining to follow the reasoning of the 
Seventh Circuit, which held that CERCLA required courts to adopt a single method of accounting 
for settlements); Ferrey, supra note 37, at 371 (noting that § 9613(f) allows courts to consider 
equitable factors when distributing costs among responsible parties); cf. Akzo, 197 F.3d at 307–08 
(holding that courts must apply the UCATA approach to account for partial private party settle-
ments). 
 94 Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308. 
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statutory interpretation, however, sounder logic would hold that Congress’s 
silence on an accounting method for private party settlements suggests that 
courts may apportion costs using “equitable factors,” which includes the 
discretion to determine how a settlement affects the liability of non-settling 
parties.95 Although the imposition of a single method of accounting may 
provide predictability, the complex nature of environmental contamination 
cases, coupled with the statute’s express reference to “equitable factors” in 
determining the apportionment of response costs, makes the Ninth Circuit’s 
reading of the statute most conducive to furthering the goals of CERCLA.96 
CONCLUSION 
Private party settlements in contribution actions under § 9613(f) of 
CERCLA should be accounted for using the most equitable method in a 
given case. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit correctly held with the First Cir-
cuit that no single apportionment method controls every case under 
§ 9613(f). Exclusive imposition of either the UCATA approach or the pro-
portionate share approach fails to account for the complexity and variability 
of the facts of CERCLA cases, and thus would fail to further the goals of 
the statute. 
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 95 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate re-
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